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CENTRAL question in the study of voting behavior is the question of
/~ voter rationality. If voters make rational candidate selections, then1-1 elections may serve as a control device to insure responsive public
officials. Empirical research on voter rationality, however, reaches several
different conclusions. Some studies2 find that voters fail to meet standards of
rationality while others find most voters capable of rational vote choice.3 Un-
derlying these research differences (other than a focus on different elections),
are different perceptions of the type of behavior necessary to be considered
rational. Some analyStS4 set high standards to determine whether or not a voter
is rational. These proponents of synoptic rationality5 require a voter to be in-
terested in politics, well informed on the issues, have clear guiding principles on
which to base the vote decision, and rationally (a means-ends calculus) select the
best candidate in terms of these guiding principles. Under this conception of
rationality, a rational vote maximizes the desired output (the voter’s utility) in
terms of the voter’s preferences while using all possible information. In most
cases these analysts find that voters lack the cognitive abilities to meet this
standard.
Other students of electoral behavior argue that the investment of effort
required by synoptic rationality may not, in fact, be rational If the costs
involved in making a synoptic decision exceed the difference in benefits be-
tween the top two alternatives (candidates), then expending the time and
resources necessary to make a synoptic decision would be a poor investment.
NOTE: The data presented here were gathered under National Science Foundation Grant GS-
35408, Robert D. McClure and Thomas E. Patterson, principal investigators. I would like to
thank Robert deVoursney, Philip L. Beardsley, Samuel Kirkpatrick, and two anonymous
reviewers of this journal for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 John H. Kessel, "Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting," American Political Science Review 66 (June
1972): 459-65, provides a comprehensive list of issue voting studies; many of these studies
implicitly deal with rationality. Additional studies since that time include Norman Frohlich,
Joe A. Openheimer, Jeffrey Smith, and Oran R. Young, "A Test of Downsian Voter Ration-
ality," American Political Science Review 72 (March 1978): 178-97; John E. Jackson, "Issues,
Party Choices, and Presidential Votes," American Journal of Political Science 19 (May 1975):
161-86; Thomas E. Patterson, Robert D. McClure, and Kenneth J. Meier, "Issue Voting and
Voter Rationality," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, September 1974, Chicago, Illinois. See also the entire issue of American Politics
Quarterly 3 (July 1975) with articles by Richard J. Trilling; A. J. Mackelprang, Bernard
Grofman, and N. Keith Thomas; Samuel A. Kirkpatrick; Eugene Declercq, Thomas L.
Hurley, and Norman R. Luttbeg; and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, William Lyons, and Michael R.
Fitzgerald.
2 Two good examples are Bernard R. Berelson, Paul L. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), especially the final chapter, and Angus
Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New
York: Wiley, 1960).
3 See Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity," American Political Science Review 66 (June
1972): 415-28; Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy," American Political Science
Review 66 (June 1972): 429-48; Stanley Kelley, Jr. and Thad W. Mirer, "The Simple Act of
Voting," American Political Science Review 68 (June 1974): 572-91; David RePass, "Issue
Salience and Party Choice," American Political Science Review 65 (June 1971): 389-400.
4 See Berelson et al., Voting, pp. 307ff; Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 543ff.
5 The terms "synoptic" and "incremental" are from David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom,A
Strategy for Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1963). Although voter decisions resemble
incremental decisions, the term "limited rationality" is probably a better description.
6 Frohlich, Openheimer, Smith, and Young, "A Test of Downsian ...," p. 180.
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Anthony Downs further discounts the value of synoptic decisions by arguing
that the difference in utility between the two alternatives must be discounted by
the probability that a person’s vote will influence the election results.7 In an
American presidential election where the voter casts one vote in 70 million, the
probability of influencing the outcome is miniscule. Given this small probability
of influencing who wins the election, almost any investment in campaign
information is irrational.
If synoptic decision-making is not rational for voters, what is? According to
some students of decision theory, a form of incremental or limited rationality
may be more appropriate.8 Limited rationality differs from synoptic in that
limited rationality does not require all alternatives to be evaluated, does not
require clear guiding principles, and limits the information necessary to reach a
decision. The decision-maker satisfies, i.e., selects an alternative and deter-
mines if it is satisfactory.9 If it is, the decision-maker remains with the selection.
If it is not, the decision-maker makes a limited search for a new alternative that
will be satisfactory. In the area of voting behavior one conscious use of limited
rationality is Kelley and Mirer who predict vote choice by summing the voter’s
likes and dislikes about candidates and parties.10
This research is an attempt to apply the concept of incremental or limited
rationality to voting behavior using Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy.11 i
First, a portion of Downs’ theory will be presented in modified form to fit U.S.
presidential elections. Second, this paper will argue that Downs presents a voter
who decides using a limited rationality yet incorporates sufficient information
about politics to make the decision appear rational to outside observers. Third,
Downs’ theory of vote choice will be tested in an empirical analysis of the 1972
election. Fourth, through the use of panel data and analysis, this paper will
determine if the voter’s decision process actually follows the limited rational
model or if the empirical relationships are the result of post hoc rationalizations.
Downs’ Theory and Concepts
A brief discussion of Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy will reveal that
his theory begins in the traditional pattern of synoptic rationality but evolves
into one accepting a limited rationality. Central to Downs’ theory is the concept
of utility. Although Downs does not discuss the formation of utilities, their
formation is straightforward. Rational man is assumed to have a series of values
(V;) which he can rank in order of preference and information concerning the
probability of each value being attained if certain conditions exist (P;). The
expected utility of any action (E(Ua)) is the sum of the products of all values and
their respective probabilities:
Where t is the time span,
a is the existing conditions, and
N is the number of values.
Since deciding how to vote, where real preferences exist, is no different from
making any other type of rational decision, some utility must entice the voter to
vote for one candidate or the other. Not all of a voter’s utility need be calculated
7 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 40ff.
8 Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision.
9 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1976).
10 Kelley and Mirer, "The Simple Act of Voting."
11 Other applications of Downs include Frolich, Openheimer, Smith, and Young; and William R.
Shaffer, Computer Simulations of Voting Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
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in economic dollar terms; many voters probably received moral satisfaction
from such policies as the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, comprehensive
energy proposals, or new approaches to urban policy. In fact, all utilities may be
measurable only by indirect means such as survey scales.
Rational political man, according to Downs, votes on expected party differ-
ential, i.e., his vote is based on which party will generate the greater amount of
personal utility over the next electoral interval:l2
V = E(Ua,) - E(Ubl)
Where V signifies the respondent’s vote,
a is the incumbent political party,
b is the opposition party
tl is the next electoral term.
A comparison of future utilities made by examining platforms, however, is not
totally rational since platforms may contain distortions calculated to attract
votes, and since outside forces often force an official to deviate from platform
positions after the election. To avoid basing a decision on two hypothetical
utilities which incorporate a great deal of uncertainty, thus increasing decision
costs, the voter seeks certainty. To vote with some certainty, the voter must have
other indicators of the course of action a party would take and the resulting
utility. Since rational parties have continuity, i.e., they support the same general
policies over time, the voter can estimate the incumbent party’s expected future
utility, E(Ual), by the utility he received during the last electoral interval, (U~ ).
More simply expressed, the voter estimates the future utility of &dquo;a&dquo; in office by
&dquo;a’s&dquo; past performance in office.
Having Uao as an estimate of E(U~ I)’ one cannot compare Uao with E(Ubl) to
determine how a respondent will vote since it would be irrational to compare
two utilities under different conditions. To standardize the two measures, one
must predict the utility the voter would have received the past four years if
party b were in office, E(Ubo). This comparison is more rational in Downs’
opinion than the prior one since it is based on one actual utility and one
hypothetical utility rather than two hypothetical utilities.
Since a voter is choosing a future government, Downs contends only an
irrational voter would totally ignore the future. To incorporate some future
orientation, the expected party differential is modified by two other indicators
of future utility. The first is a trend factor for the incumbent party; if the
amount of utility has increased recently, then a voter will be more likely to
support the in-party since he assumes the trend will continue. If the trend is
toward decreasing utility, then a voter would rationally choose the out-party if
the expected utility differential is close.
A second future modifying factor enters if, and only if, the expected party
differential is zero or close to zero. (The model assumes that some threshold of
expected utility must be exceeded before the voter can be enticed to vote at all.)
To increase the rationality of his decision, a voter seeks another indicator of the
out-party’s future performance, the utility he/she received the last time the
out-party was in office. 13 If expected party differential is still zero, the citizen
will abstain from voting for either party.
Downs’ model of voting behavior needs to be modified slightly to fit
American presidential elections. Unlike the politics of many other western
nations, U.S. politics is candidate-oriented with individual candidates running
12 The following argument can be found in its entirety in Downs, pp. 38-41, 97.
13 Downs, p. 42-43. The performance of the out-party the last time it held office as an indicator of
future utility assumes, of course, party consistency. This assumption is questionable if candi-
dates can run independently of their parties. The 1972 election is particularly important in
this regard since one candidate, McGovern, ran against the party establishment.
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independently of their party. The influence of candidates can be incorporated
into Downs’ model by using candidate differentials rather than party differ-
entials. This substitution is consistent with the relative decline of partisanship in
presidential elections and with other attempts to operationalize Downs in U.S.
settings.l4
Downs’ theory of vote choice has several elements of limited rationality
despite its reliance on utility calculations. The voter bases his/her decision on
candidate’s past performance in office. In effect, this evaluation may be done
without extensive utility calculations; the voter can simply ask if he/she received
satisfactory utility from candidate a’s performance in office. If not, would
candidate b have provided greater utility? The decision becomes a relatively
simple choice between two alternatives, usually marginally different, based on
the past performance of one candidate in office. In addition, the voter need not
hold positions on a variety of issues, need not place candidates on those issues,
and need not calculate the utility of various issue positions. 15
Despite its simplicity, this limited form of rationality remains fairly close to
politics so that the outside observer would consider such a decision rational.
The voter evaluates the performance of candidates in office rather than basing
his/her vote on affective evaluations without political content.
OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF DOWNS’ VARIABLES
Since the voter deals with perceptions rather than objective &dquo;reality,&dquo; some
measure must be constructed to tap a respondent’s evaluation of candidate past
performance or hypothetical past performance. The evaluations were mea-
sured during each wave of a three-wave panel survey by having the respondent
locate his evaluation on a seven-point scale ranging from extremely good to
extremely bad. 16 Voters responded to an item such as &dquo;Richard Nixon’s han-
dling of the Vietnam War.&dquo;
The score on this item should indicate the respondent’s evaluation of
Nixon’s handling of the Vietnam War; to measure overall past performance
eight separate items were used: the race question, relations with China, the
drug problem, unemployment, relations with the Soviet Union, law and order,
inflation, and the Vietnam War. 17 Similar measures were constructed for
George McGovern by asking for an evaluation &dquo;if George McGovern had been
President.&dquo; In addition, an overall performance indicator was collected but not
used because the eight items generated more information on which aspects of
past performance contributed most to electoral success and required specific
rather than general answers.
14 Both Frolich et al. and Schaffer use candidate differentials rather than party differentials. On
the decline of parties see Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of
American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); and Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The
Ticket-Splitter (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William Erdman’s Publishing, 1972).
15 This is the weakness of other empirical uses of Downs. Both Frolich et al. and Schaffer use issues
to estimate party differentials. Downs explicitly uses past performance which is easier for the
voter to discern.
16 The data for this paper come from a panel survey of registered voters conducted during the 1972 
presidential election campaign. The panel was selected by standard area probability tech-
niques from the Syracuse, New York, metropolitan area. The panel had three pre-election
waves &mdash; early September, early October, and early November &mdash; with interviews by profes-
sional interviewers lasting approximately ninety minutes each, followed by a brief post-
election telephone interview. Beginning with 731 respondents in the first wave, 650 were
re-interviewed in October and 659 were contacted in November. Overall 626, or 86 percent,
of the original panel were interviewed all three times.
17 This procedure, it is true, may not tap the issues of greatest concern to the respondent. But when
the general indicator of past performance was used, separately and in tandem with the other
measures, the prediction of vote choice was not statistically better. One could argue, there-
fore, few central performance evaluations were missed.
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Departing from a strict application of Downs, a separate indicator of the
incumbent’s performance trend was not included. Voter perceptions of past
performance should be colored by the most recent events, a &dquo;what have you
done for me lately&dquo; response to politics; a logical demand given the cognitive
limitations preventing synoptic rationality. If the recency perspective domi-
nates politics, then those areas which have had a notable flurry of activity should
register a more favorable (or less favorable depending on the circumstances)
rating. Since the Nixon trips to Russia and China are instances where recent
dramatic changes were made, if a trend factor is incorporated in the scale items,
the ratings on those scales should be more favorable than the other scales. Table
1 demonstrates that Nixon’s performance regarding Russia and China were
more favorably received than the domestic policies which were relatively stable
in the year before the election. The indicators probably reflect a trend factor.
TABLE 1. PAST PERFORMANCE SCORES BY CANDIDATE AND WAVE OF THE SURVEY
When candidate differential approaches zero, the key factor in predicting
vote choice, according to Downs, is the respondent’s evaluation of the out-
party’s last term in office. Since no questions were specifically asked about the
Johnson administration, an index had to be constructed. Applying Downs’
theory, any voter who had a favorable opinion of Johnson would have voted for
Humphrey in 1968, and Nixon voters in 1968 would have been dissatisfied with
Johnson.18 To expand the out-party variable further, party identification was
incorporated; a Republican who voted for Humphrey was coded as having a
more positive attitude toward Johnson than a Democrat who voted for Hum-
phrey since the Republican’s short-term component was more influential and
thus indicative of a stronger feeling. Similar categories were established for
Nixon voters with Democrats for Nixon less favorable to Johnson than were
Republicans for Nixon.
Vote intention, a predisposition to vote for one candidate or the other, was
measured by the two seven-point scales where the respondents assessed the
18 As noted above, Downs argues that a favorable evaluation of the incumbent is rationally
translated into a vote for the incumbent’s party. Humphrey voters in 1968 could, therefore,
be assumed to be favorably disposed toward Johnson while Nixon voters could be assumed to
evaluate Johnson unfavorably. Although many counter examples could be suggested, the use
of 1968 vote as an indicator of pro- or anti-Johnson evaluation is logically consistent with
Downs’ theory. An indicator of the measure validity is the correlation between the Humphrey
and Johnson feeling thermometers in the 1968 election. The highest correlation between any
two feeling thermometers of possible candidates was between Johnson and Humphrey
(r=.7). See Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerold Rusk, and A. C. Wolfe, "Continuity
and Change in American Politics," American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969):
1083-1105. The final utility scale for the out-party variable looks like this:
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probability (from extremely likely to extremely unlikely) that they will vote for
Richard Nixon/George McGovern. The difference between the scales (scored
from plus six to minus six) is defined as vote intention and can be interpreted as
the probability of voting for one candidate or the other. Vote intention corre-
lates highly with the actual vote cast and has the advantage of greater variation.
Because few studies have measured perceptions of candidate past perform-
ance in office and because none have operationalized the measures in this
manner, a note on the reliability of the measures is in order. If the items fail to
show an acceptable degree of reliability, the results produced will have little
value since unreliable measures attenuate correlations and bias other parame-
ter estimates. Heise has developed a method of estimating a concept’s reliability
when the variable is measured at three different times and when the real values
of the variable vary as a function of some exogenous variables.19 The reliability
coefficient for the candidate differential is .92 while that for vote intention is
.95. The magnitude of these coefficients indicates that the measures are fairly
reliable.
Past performance scale measurements (see Table 1) provide a rough
indicator of each candidate’s strengths and weaknesses. Richard Nixon re-
ceived by far his best scores for his handling of relations with China and the
Soviet Union. In spite of McGovern’s criticisms of the war in Vietnam, Nixon
received his next highest rating on his Vietnam policy, followed by law and
order, and race, respectively. If the Nixon record had a soft spot, it was the
traditionally Democratic bread and butter issues - inflation and unemploy-
ment. When compared with the Nixon record, the McGovern campaign, as
presented by the news media, was directed at Nixon’s strengths rather than at
his weaknesses.2° The result was that Senator McGovern began the campaign
with positive evaluations on most of his past performance indicators but pro-
gressively lost ground on foreign policy issues. In traditional areas of Demo-
cratic strength he retained his favorable evaluations but consistently trailed the
incumbent on every issue.
A favorable evaluation of Nixon’s first term in office (summed over the
eight indicators) should be positively related to intention to vote for Nixon.
Table 2 shows not only the positive relationship but also that the correlation
TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT’S INTENTION TO VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE
AND THE PAST PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THAT CANDIDATE
19 See David R. Heise, "Separating Reliability From Stability in Test-Retest Correlations," American
Sociological Review 34 (February 1969): 93-101. The formula used to calculate the reliability
coefficients is as follows:
Where rtt is the reliability coefficient and rij is the correlation between the variable
measured the ith time and the jth time.
For an alternative set of assumptions see D. E. Wiley and J. A. Wiley, "The Estimation of
Measurement Error in Panel Data," American Sociological Review 35 (February 1970): 112-17.
20 A content analysis of national news programs broadcast during the 1972 election campaign (see
Thomas E. Patterson and Robert D. McClure, The Unseeing Eye (New York: Putnam, 1976)
revealed that the three networks averaged eighteen stories per network on McGovern’s
Vietnam position, far more than any other issue. Corruption averaged eleven stories and no
other issue received more than five stories per network. The networks, therefore, cast the
McGovern challenge largely in terms of the Vietnam War.
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increased over time indicating that as the decision time approached, the re-
lationship strengthened (rI=.60, r2=.66, r3=.72).21 Similarly, favorable evalu-
ation of Senator McGovern’s hypothetical past performance is positively re-
lated to intention to vote for McGovern, and the correlations also increase over
time (rl=.58, r2=.65, r3=.66). The voter, however, must choose between the
alternatives presented, not decide on each candidate separately. This decision,
according to our theory, is based on the difference between the two expected
utilities. The difference between the two performance ratings (candidate
differential) correlated strongly with vote intention (Table 3). Similar to the
TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VOTE INTENTION AND
CANDIDATE DIFFERENTIAL BY SURVEY WAVE
previous relationships, the correlations between candidate differential and
vote intention increased from .73 in September to .76 in October and .78 by the
final wave in November. When corrected for attenuation caused by the lack of
perfect reliability of the measures, the correlations increase to .78, .81, and .83
respectively. A closer inspection of the data reveals that the relationship is even
stronger than the correlations demonstrate. Table 4 displays both November
vote choice and past performance evaluations as dichotomous variables. As
Table 4 reveals, the simplified Downs model can predict 94.5 percent of the
final vote correctly simply by considering the direction, but not the intensity of
the respondent’s candidate differential. 22
TABLE 4. THE STRENGTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOTE CHOICE AND
CANDIDATE PAST PERFORMANCE DIFFERENTIAL
Since the out-party candidate has some difficulty establishing a past per-
formance public record and since the voter correspondingly has even more
difficulty evaluating the utility of this hypothetical situation, the &dquo;second&dquo;
future modifier, the out-party’s last term in office, was added to the model. To
21 Each item in the index was weighted equally. A separate set of indicators on item salience to use as
weights was not included in the survey. This procedure is consistent with Kelley and Mirer,
Frolich et al. and most other issue, performance, or evaluative indices of candidates. The
exception, of course, is RePass who improves predictions of vote choice by using a salience
factor.
22 The correlations and predictions are so high as to invite skepticism. One possibility is that both
vote intention and candidate differential are caused by a general candidate evaluation. This
data set includes a series of items to tap the images the respondents had or the candidates on a
variety of dimensions such as honesty, trustworthiness, etc. The candidate image index is
strongly correlated with both vote intention (r=.6) and candidate differential (r=.6). If
candidate image is controlled, candidate differential is still strongly correlated with vote
intention (partial r = .5). Candidate differential probably does contain some elements of
candidate image just as it contains some elements of issue positions, but is also taps the
additional unique factor of past performance. Party identification also correlates highly with
candidate differential (r=.5) but controlling for party identification has little impact on the
vote intention &mdash; candidate differential correlation (partial r=.7).
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add the Johnson utility indicator some estimate must be made of the respon-
dent’s candidate differential threshold (e.g., the amount of utility necessary to
interest the citizen in voting) because Johnson’s performance only affects the
respondent’s vote if the candidate differential approaches zero. Since voters
demonstrate an overwhelming willingness to evaluate the Nixon administra-
tion and the hypothetical McGovern administration, only the 10 percent of the
respondents with the smallest candidate differential were arbitrarily classified
as having a candidate differential too small to breach the utility threshold.
Adding the Johnson factor to the equation of the voters with near-zero differ-
entials did not produce appreciably different results. The correlations im-
proved slightly to .74, .77, and .79 in the three waves, hardly a significant
increase.
A closer analysis of the 1972 election reveals why adding the Johnson past
performance indicator did not result in a significant improvement in predic-
tion. First, although McGovern’s record was less familiar than Nixon’s, voters
did describe his positions on most key campaign issues accurately. 23 The
McGovern issue stands generated sufficient information about the candidate
differential. Second, McGovern was not strongly associated with the Demo-
cratic party and took pains to disassociate himself with the record of the
Johnson administration on Vietnam. Third, former Vice President Hum-
phrey, the candidate most strongly associated with the Johnson administration
in 1968, also sought the nomination; and his opposition to Senator McGovern
perhaps led to further disassociation of McGovern from the party of Lyndon
Johnson.
VOTER CHOICE: RATIONAL OR RATIONALIZING
The correlations found in the 1972 election do not demonstrate that the
voters decided in a rational manner. A voter could, for example, decide how to
vote and then alter his/her candidate differential to correspond with the previ-
ously decided vote choice. This rationalizing behavior would produce positive
correlations between candidate differential and vote intention even if no ra-
tional behavior took place.
The similar results of rationality and rationalizing plague most voting
research in this area since they prevent the analyst from drawing any conclu-
sions about the decision process. The difference between rationality and
rationalization cannot be determined statistically using cross-sectional data;
but, the panel design of the present study allows one to draw some tentative
conclusions about the &dquo;direction of causality&dquo; and, thus, rationality.
Figure I depicts the possible relationships between vote intention (V) and
candidate differential (C) measured at two different times. Since this model
23 The two candidates’ positions are, on the average, accurately placed by the voters. The following
scores indicate whether the public viewed the candidate as supporting the issue (positive
scores) or opposing the issue (negative scores). The magnitude of the score is an indicator of
the electorate’s certainty.
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I .
FIGURE 1: GENERAL PANEL MODEL
contains eight paths and six possible correlations which can be calculated,
further assumptions are necessary to identify all equations. Specifically, we
assume that candidate differential can affect vote only after a time lag and that
vote can affect candidate differential only after a time lag.24 This assumption
eliminates the path from V2 to C2 and from C2 to V2 and leaves the identified
model in Figure 2. Given the model in Figure 2, if we assume that candidate
FIGURE 2: IDENTIFIED PANEL MODEL
differential is a cause of vote intention, vote intention at time 2 should become
more congruent with candidate differential at time 1. Because candidate
differential would not be affected by vote intention under this assumption, its
change relative to vote would be random, reducing the congruence between
vote intention at time I and candidate differential at time 2. Thus, Campbel125
argues if rvic2 (the correlation between vote intention at time 1 and candidate
differential at time 2) exceeds rcIV2 (the correlation between candidate differ-
ential 1 and vote 2), then vote intention would be the more probable cause of
change in candidate differential. If rcIV2 exceeds rvIC2, candidate differential
would be causally prior.
Since Campbell’s original essay several scholars26 have suggested im-
provements in panel analysis. Basically the improvements entail controlling for
24 An alternative assumption to causal impact only after a time lag is the assumption that all causal
impact is direct, resulting in the following model:
When the parameters of this model were estimated using two-stage least squares, the infer-
ences as to causation were identical to the lagged model. The model with direct causation was
rejected, however, because the assumption that candidate differential 1 affects vote 2 only
through candidate differential 2 is tenuous. If candidate differential and vote are reciprocally
related at time 2, it is implausible that they are not reciprocally related at time 1. The result
would be several underidentified equations. If different exogenous variables could be found
which fit the assumptions of the model, the model could be used.
25 Donald T. Campbell, "From Description to Experimentation," in C. W. Harris, Problems in
Measuring Change (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962).
26 George W. Bohrnstedt, "Observations on the Measurement of Change," Sociological Methodology
1969 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), pp. 113-33; Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews,
"Detecting Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," American Sociological Review 29 (December
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autocorrelation 27 with Pelz and Andrews comparing partial correlations
102 and rciv2 . c2) and Heise using path coefficients estimated from the model in
Figure 1 (pc2vl and PV2C 1) - In both cases the larger of the controlled coefficients
indicates the causal relationship.28 Given the problems with the simple correla-
tions, this analysis will use the paths approach of Heise and the partials ap-
proach of Pelz and Andrews to determine the relationship between candidate
differential and vote intention.
TABLE 5. CROSSLAGGED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CANDIDATE DIFFERENTIAL (C)
AND VOTE INTENTION (V)
*Vote Intention Causes Candidate Differential to Change
**Candidate Differential Causes Vote Intention to Change
Table 5 shows the cross-lagged relationships between vote intention and
candidate differential for all voters. Both the September-October relationships
and the September-November relationships indicate that candidate differential is
adjusted to conform to vote intention, a clear case of rationalizing behavior. Changes
in the last month of the campaign, however, are inconclusive, forming neither a
rational or a rationalizing pattern. The data on the first months of the campaign
fail to support Down’s theory of rational voters,29 while data for the last month
of the campaign indicate the behavior may not be simply rationalization.
Before we accept the conclusion that the correlation between candidate
differential and vote intention is the result of rationalization, one plausible rival
hypothesis should be entertained. The cross-lagged technique used here is
sensitive to change in either past performance evaluations or vote intention and
relatively insensitive to stable preferences. Most voters had already reached a
decision by the time the survey instrument was in the field (September 1972) so
that vote intention was fairly stable. The past performance evaluations were
more fluid; and since these tended to change in a direction consistent with vote
intention, the change appeared as rationalization.
This change may well be rational behavior. Assume for the sake of argu-
ment that voter A has decided to vote for candidate B by July. Even with this
decision if voter A is rational, voter A will continue to monitor the political
environment, though at a reduced level, to be sure the decision was correct.
This monitoring will change the voter’s past performance evaluations of the
candidates slightly but not, under most conditions, the voter’s vote intention.
This seemingly rational action will appear as rationalization when examined by
the cross-lagged technique.
1964): 836-48; David R. Heise, "Causal Inferences From Panel Data," Sociological Methodology
1970 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970), pp. 3-27.
27 Autocorrelation is a problem simply because V 1is the most likely cause of V2. The correlation
between C1 and V2 might be large and positive solely because rC1V1 is positive and because
there is a strong relationship between V1 and V2.
28 For example, if the path from V 1to C2 is larger than the path from C1to V2, then vote intention is
causally prior to candidate differential; and we have a case of rationalizing behavior.
29 Actually Downs uses rationality in an instrumental or axiomatic sense. He assumes voters are
rational and deduces predictions from that assumption. He believes the utility of a theory is a
function of its predictive ability rather than the truth of its assumptions. As a result Downs
would not be interested if voters were in fact rational as long as their behavior could be
predicted by assuming they were rational. See Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 21.
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The rational/rationalizing issue can only be resolved if surveys are in the
field before vote decisions are finalized. One imperfect test of this issue with the
present data, however, is possible - examining the decisions of those voters
who actually decide how to vote during the campaign. Late deciders, however,
are the least likely group of voters to engage in rational behavior since they tend
to be less interested and less informed about the election than those who
decided early .3 Although late deciders have characteristics that suggest they
will rationalize, Table 6 shows that of the 95 respondents who were undecided
in September and who voted in November, nearly 70 percent voted for the
candidate they favored on the past performance indicators. Since these voters
had formed performance evaluations prior to selecting a candidate, this behavior
cannot be considered rationalization. The behavior of the late deciders also indi-
cates that many of the early deciders probably selected their candidates in a
rational manner.31
TABLE 6. SEPTEMBER UNDECIDEDS CAST BALLOTS FOR CANDIDATE
EVALUATED MORE POSITIVELY IN SEPTEMBER
CONCLUSION
This analysis has applied the concept of limited rationality to voters’
decisions in the 1972 election in an attempt to resolve the difference between
the voters’ cognitive abilities and the requisites of rational decision-making.
This analysis argued that with high decision costs and low marginal returns,
synoptic rationality was inappropriate to the study of voting behavior. Rather,
vote decisions were structured in terms of limited or incremental rationality.
Pursuing this argument, the operationalization of Downs’ incremental theory
of vote choice as limited rational decision-making produced useful results as
demonstrated by the high correlations between candidate differential and vote
intention (r = .83). When candidate differential is restricted to direction rather
than intensity and direction, the results were even better, accurately predicting
94.5 percent of the vote.
After the Downsian theory was operationalized, the analysis attempted to
determine if the high correlations were the result of rational decision-making
or rationalization. If the correlation between candidate differential and vote
intention resulted because voters rationalized their candidate differential in
terms of their previously established vote intention, this would rule out a
30 Berelson et al., Voting, pp. 148, 252.
31 The findings here should be qualified in terms of the characteristics of the 1972 general election:
1972 set records for both low turnout and voter defection. With one candidate, McGovern,
running an ideological, issue-oriented campaign, normal decision cues such as party identifi-
cation had less relevance. Except for a reversal of parties, the 1972 election bears some
similarity to the 1964 election and Goldwater’s issue-oriented campaign against an en-
trenched incumbent. In such elections the electorate is presented with more information on
candidates allowing "more sophisticated" decision cues such as past performance or issues to
be used. With the additional self selection (because of the low turnout), the quality of the
electorate’s decision should be greater than under normal circumstances. In some respects,
then, the 1972 election is an ideal time to seek rationality among the voters; and the findings
may not be generalized to other elections.
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rational process. Within a group of voters who delayed their decisions until the
election campaign, rational behavior was evident. Since these voters were the
ones least likely to engage in rational candidate selection because they had less
interest in politics, the results suggest some of the electorate can exercise
rational judgment in selecting presidential candidates.
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